b. Ideal-Language Philosophy vs. Ordinary-Language Philosophy
Russellian analysis has just been just identified as logical rather than linguistic analysis, and yet it was said in a previous paragraph that this was analysis in the sense made familiar by Moore. In truth, there were both significant similarities and significant differences between Moorean and Russellian analysis. On the one hand, Russellian analysis was like Moore’s in that it involved the rephrasing of a sentence into another sentence semantically equivalent but grammatically different. On the other hand, Russell’s analyses were not given in ordinary language, as Moore’s were. Instead, they were given in symbolic logic, that is, in a quasi-mathematical, symbolic notation that made the structure of Russell’s analyzed propositions exceedingly clear. For instance, with the definitions of Mx as “x is a mountain” and Gx as “x is golden,” the proposition that the golden mountain does not exist becomes
~[(∃x)(Mx&Gx) &∀y((My &Gy) → y=x)]
相对于语言学分析，罗素的分析更多地被认为是逻辑分析，而在前一小节说过的，这种分析方法也和穆尔所做的类似。事实上，罗素和穆尔的分析有明显的类似和不同。在一方面，罗素的分析强调将语句改述为语义上等同，但语法上不同的另一语句，这是与穆尔相似的。在另一方面，罗素的分析没有用日常语言来表述，这不同于穆尔的做法。相反，他们采用了一种符号逻辑，就是一种类数学的，符号标记法，这使得罗素的分析命题的结构十分地清晰。例如，定义Mx是“x 是一座山”且Gx是“x是金的”，命题金山不存在则变为了
Equivalently, in English, it is not the case that there is some object such that (1) it is a mountain, (2) it is golden, and (3) all objects that are mountains and golden are identical to it. (For more on what this sort of notation looks like and how it works, see the article on Propositional Logic, especially Section 3.)
等同地，在英语中，可以表示为，没有一种客体它既是山，又是金的，并且所有是山并且是金的客体都和它同一。
By 1910, Russell, along with Alfred North Whitehead, had so developed this symbolic notation and the rules governing its use that it constituted a fairly complete system of formal logic. This they published in the three volumes of their monumental Principia Mathematica (Russell and Whitehead 1910-1913).
到1910年，罗素，和Alfred North Whitehead一起，发展了符号标记法和规定它的用法的一些规则，这构建了一个相当完备的形式逻辑系统。这也出版在他们的数学原理三大卷中。
Within the analytic movement, the Principia was received as providing an ideal language, capable of elucidating all sorts of ordinary-language confusions. Consequently, Russellian logical analysis was seen as a new species of the genus linguistic analysis, which had already been established by Moore. Furthermore, many took logical analysis to be superior to Moore’s ordinary-language analysis insofar as its results (its analyses) were more exact and not themselves prone to further misunderstandings or illusions.
在分析哲学运动中，《数学原理》被认为是提供了一种能够解释所有日常语言疑惑的理想语言能力。因此，罗素式的逻辑分析被视作是被穆尔建立的语言分析的一种全新的方法。除此之外，许多人认为，就其更加准确并且并不会使人有迷惑的结果来看，逻辑分析要优于穆尔的日常语言分析。
The distinction between ordinary-language philosophy and ideal-language philosophy formed the basis for a fundamental division within the analytic movement through the early 1960s. The introduction of logical analysis also laid the groundwork for logical atomism, a new metaphysical system developed by Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Before we discuss this directly, however, we must say a word about GottlobFrege.
日常语言哲学和理想语言哲学的区分形成了在1960年代早期分析哲学运动中的根本性的划分。这个关于逻辑分析的引入也为一种新的由罗素和维特根斯坦发展的形而上学系统——逻辑原子主义奠定了基础。在我们直接讨论逻辑原子主义之前，我们必须要先谈一谈弗洛伊德。